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Medical Marijuana and the Limits of the 
Compassionate Use Act: 
Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications 
Deborah J. La Fetra* 
Gary Ross suffered a back injury while serving his country in the 
United States Air Force and treats the continuing pain and spasms with 
marijuana, pursuant to California’s Compassionate Use Act.1  Due to his 
ongoing ingestion of marijuana, Ross failed the pre-employment drug test 
required by RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc., an information 
technology company.2  Upon receiving notice of this failure, Ragingwire 
fired Ross, who had begun work a few days prior.  Ross sued the company 
for discrimination under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act 
(FEHA)3 and for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.4 
The sympathetic facts of Ross’s plight—particularly his status as an 
honored veteran—might have invited the California Supreme Court to look 
for narrow grounds to uphold his complaint. 
But on January 24, 2008, the California Supreme Court rejected 
Ross’s claims, based on a plain-language reading of the Compassionate 
Use Act.  The court reviewed the language of the Compassionate Use Act, 
which makes no reference to employment, and also made note of the 
proponents’ ballot arguments, which spoke of protecting patients from 
criminal penalties for marijuana and keeping cancer patients out of jail.5  
The court explained that “[n]o state law could completely legalize 
marijuana for medical purposes because the drug remains illegal under 
federal law . . . even for medical users.  Instead of attempting the 
impossible . . . California’s voters merely exempted medical users and their 
primary caregivers from criminal liability under two specifically designated 
state statutes.”6 
 
* Principal Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation; J.D. 1990, University of Southern California Law 
Center.  Ms. La Fetra filed an amicus curiae brief in Ross v. Ragingwire under the auspices of Pacific 
Legal  Foundation’s  Free  Enterprise  Project. 
 1 Ross v. RagingWire Telecomm., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 202 (Cal. 2008) (citing CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2008), added by initiative, Proposition 215, as approved by voters, 
General Election (Nov. 5, 1996)). 
 2 Id. 
 3 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12900–12996 (West 2008). 
 4 Ross, 174 P.3d at 203. 
 5 Id. at 206. 
 6 Id. at 204 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 844(a)); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26–29 (2005); 
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Given the Compassionate Use Act’s “modest objectives and the 
manner in which it was presented to the voters for adoption,” the text of the 
initiative and the arguments supporting its passage yielded “no reason to 
conclude the voters intended to speak so broadly, and in a context so far 
removed from the criminal law, as to require employers to accommodate 
marijuana use.”7  Thus, the court held that “[n]othing in the text or history 
of the Compassionate Use Act suggests the voters intended the measure to 
address the respective rights and duties of employers and employees,” and 
the nondiscrimination requirements of the Fair Employment and Housing 
Act simply did not apply.8 
In so holding, the court gave a nod to California’s strong tradition of 
direct democracy, explaining that “the initiative power is strongest when 
courts give effect to the voters’ formally expressed intent, without 
speculating about how they might have felt concerning subjects on which 
they were not asked to vote.”9  The court further cited People v. 
Galambos—an earlier California court of appeal decision interpreting the 
Compassionate Use Act—in which the court observed, “the proponents’ 
ballot arguments reveal a delicate tightrope walk designed to induce voter 
approval, which we would upset were we to stretch the proposition’s 
limited immunity to cover that which its language does not.”10 
Written by Justice Werdegar, the majority opinion’s simple reference 
to the plain language of the operative law and voters’ intent contrasts 
sharply with Justice Kennard’s dissent on the FEHA issue.  Justice 
Kennard first laments that the decision is “conspicuously lacking in 
compassion,”11 and then attempts to manufacture a reason to force 
Ragingwire to employ Ross, relying in large part on the lack of evidence 
that Ross’s job actually was impaired by his marijuana use.12  The 
judiciary, of course, is not meant to impose its own views of the wisdom or 
“compassion” present in a statute.  Instead, judges are supposed to interpret 
and apply the law.13 
Ross also argued that he was wrongfully terminated in violation of 
public policy, tethering his claim to the right of medical self-
determination.14  None of the justices agreed, however, and the court 
 
United  States  v.  Oakland  Cannabis  Buyers’  Coop.,  532  U.S.  483,  491–95 (2001). 
 7 Ross, 174 P.3d at 206–07. 
 8 Id. at 202–04. 
 9 Id. at 207; see also People v. Mower, 49 P.3d 1067, 1070 (Cal. 2002) (concluding that the 
Compassionate Use Act provides only an affirmative defense to a criminal prosecution and the 
defendant has the burden of proof). 
 10 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 844, 848 (Ct. App. 2002). 
 11 Ross, 174 P.3d at 209 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 12 Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).  The lack of evidence is unsurprising given (1) 
that   the   case   never   made   it   past   the   demurrer   stage,   and   (2)   the   extremely   short   tenure   of   Ross’s  
employment.  Id. at 203. 
 13 See Bonnell v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 82 P.3d 740, 744 (Cal. 2003). 
 14 Ross, 174 P.3d at 208. 
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unanimously disposed of the claim in short order, holding that: 
[D]efendant has not prevented plaintiff from having access to marijuana.  
Defendant has only refused to employ plaintiff.  To assert that defendant’s 
refusal to employ plaintiff affects his access to marijuana is merely to restate the 
argument that the Compassionate Use Act gives plaintiff a right to use marijuana 
free of hindrance or inconvenience, enforceable against third parties.  That 
argument we have already rejected.15 
Essentially, Ross could not overcome the hurdle that marijuana 
possession and use violates federal law all of the time,16 and California law 
most of the time.  He could not claim an overarching right to possession 
and use that trumps these legislatively-announced public policies. 
This article focuses on two aspects of the employment situation 
presented in Ross v. Ragingwire.  First, this article discusses the public 
policies motivating employers to keep their workplaces drug-free, even 
when faced with an employee using medical marijuana under the 
Compassionate Use Act.  Second, this article explores the language of both 
the Compassionate Use Act and the Fair Housing and Employment Act and 
the potential ramifications if the statutes had been combined to create a 
new cause of action.  Finally, this article concludes that the California 
Supreme Court’s decision was more than just a correct application of the 
Compassionate Use Act’s language; the decision furthered justice as well.  
A contrary result would have conflated a criminal-defense statute into 
employment law governed by the broad-ranging provisions of FEHA.  The 
effect on California businesses would have been severe, placing employers 
between the rock of federal and state laws prohibiting drug-use and the 
hard place of being required to permit employees, potentially impaired by 
medical marijuana use, to continue in the workplace. 
I.  PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS EMPLOYER EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN 
A DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE 
Employers have numerous reasons to maintain a drug-free workplace.  
Among them, employers can lose government funding for projects if they 
permit employees to use illegal drugs.  Impaired employees miss more 
work than their drug-free co-workers and are more likely to make mistakes 
when they are at work.  Employers may become liable for misdeeds 
 
 15 Id. at 209 (internal citation omitted); see also id. at 216 (Kennard, J., concurring and 
dissenting) (agreeing with the majority on this point). 
 16 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 822–823, 872 
(2000) (describing Marijuana  as  a  “Schedule  I”  substance,  such  that  its  use  or  distribution  is  prohibited  
unless it is part of a Federal Drug Administration pre-approved research study conforming to stringent 
storage and record keeping requirements); Wyatt Buchanan, Pot dispensaries shut in response to 
federal threat, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 7, 2008, at B1 (noting the closure of seven medical marijuana 
dispensaries in San Francisco after the Drug Enforcement Agency notified landlords that they are 
subject to property seizure and jail time if they continue to allow the sale of marijuana on the premises, 
following similar notices and closures of dozens of dispensaries in southern California in the summer of 
2007). 
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committed by their drug-using employees.  Any one of these scenarios 
could cause adverse economic consequences to an employer, as well as to 
the employer’s shareholders, employees, or customers if the value of the 
business suffers.  As the Nebraska Supreme Court succinctly explained, a 
company establishes drug-free workplace rules to “improve work safety, to 
ensure quality production for customers, and to enhance its reputation in 
the community by showing that it has taken a visible stand against 
chemical abuse and the associated detrimental effects.”17 
A. Employers Must Comply with Drug-Free Workplace Statutes 
Companies that contract with the State of California or the federal 
government have special concerns with regard to maintaining a drug-free 
workplace.  All recipients of state funding must comply with California’s 
Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1990, regardless of the monetary value of the 
contract or grant.18  These recipients must provide annual certification that 
their employees are prohibited from using controlled substances, including 
marijuana, as a prerequisite to their continued receipt of state grants.19  The 
Act further requires contractors and grantees to establish a drug-free 
awareness program to inform employees about the dangers of, and 
penalties for, drug use and the availability of drug counseling.20  Each 
employee must agree to abide by the contractor’s or grantee’s drug policy 
as a condition of employment.21  The employer’s penalty for failing to 
comply is suspension of payments under the contract or grant, termination 
of the contract or grant, or both.  Furthermore, the contractor or grantee 
may be subject to debarment.22 
Moreover, California recipients of federal aid must provide a drug-
free workplace for employees.23  Under federal law, employers must notify 
each employee of the prohibition against using controlled substances, 
including marijuana, and the penalty for violating the law:  The suspension 
or termination of a particular grant and ultimately, debarment for up to five 
years from future grants.24  Both the state and federal Drug-Free Workplace 
Acts provide that violating the obligations of the Act or making a false 
 
 17 Dolan v. Svitak, 527 N.W.2d 621, 626 (Neb. 1995); see also Smith v. Zero Defects, Inc., 980 
P.2d  545,  550  (Idaho  1999)  (an  employer  has  “a  right  to  expect  its  employees  to  refrain  from  conduct  
that may bring dishonor on the business.”);;  Farm  Fresh  Dairy,  Inc.  v.  Blackburn,  841  P.2d  1150,  1153  
(Okla. 1992) (public policy supports drug testing to promote safety in the workplace). 
 18 CAL. GOV’T CODE §§  8350–8387 (West 2008). 
 19 Id. §§ 8351(a), 8355. 
 20 Id. § 8355(b)(2)–(4). 
 21 Id. § 8355(c). 
 22 Id. § 8356(a). 
 23 41 U.S.C. § 702 (2000). 
 24 41 U.S.C. §§ 702(a)(1)(A), 702(b) (2000); see also 49 U.S.C. § 5331 (2000); 49 C.F.R. § 
40.85(a) (2006) (United States Department of Transportation requirements that all public transportation 
employers test employees for controlled substances, including marijuana); 49 U.S.C. § 20140 (2000) 
(same for railroad carriers); 49 U.S.C. § 31306 (2000) (same for commercial motor carriers); 49 U.S.C. 
§ 45102 (2000) (same for air carriers, per Federal Aviation Administration regulations). 
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certification of compliance can result in the contract’s suspension or 
termination, and may result in debarment of the non-complying contractor 
or grantee. 
B. Marijuana Use has an Adverse Impact on Employee Performance 
California employers have statutory authorization to remove drug-
using employees from the workplace.25  These employers have legitimate 
reasons for wanting to do so, even if they are not subject to the federal or 
state Drug-Free Workplace laws.  Employer fears of employee 
absenteeism, shiftlessness, or malfeasance while under the influence of 
marijuana, even when recommended for medical purposes, rest on medical 
studies demonstrating a wide range of impacts that can occur, especially 
with prolonged ingestion of the drug.  While not discounting the potential 
benefits to patients and recommending further study, American Medical 
Association studies state that marijuana ingested for medicinal purposes 
may have the same biological side-effects as marijuana ingested for 
recreational purposes.26  Marijuana increases the heart rate, and a person’s 
blood pressure may decrease on standing.  Marijuana intoxication can 
cause “impairment of short-term memory, attention, motor skills, reaction 
time, and the organization and integration of complex information.”27  
Users may experience intensified senses, increased talkativeness, altered 
perceptions, and time distortion followed by drowsiness and lethargy.28  
“Heavy users may experience apathy, lowered motivation, and impaired 
cognitive performance.”29 
These effects translate into potential problems in the workplace.  
People who smoke marijuana frequently, but do not smoke tobacco, have 
more health problems and miss more days of work than nonsmokers.30  
Many of these extra sick days are due to respiratory illnesses.31  Marijuana 
 
 25 CAL. LAB. CODE §   1025   (West   2008)   (“Nothing   in   [the   Alcohol   and   Drug   Rehabilitation]  
chapter shall be construed to prohibit an employer from refusing to hire, or discharging an employee 
who,  because  of  the  employee’s  current  use of alcohol or drugs, is unable to perform his or her duties, 
or cannot perform the duties in a manner which would not endanger his or her health or safety or the 
health  or  safety  of  others.”);;  accord Lamke v. Sunstate Equip. Co., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1053 (N.D. 
Cal.   2004)   (Section   1025   “does   not   express   substantial   and   fundamental   public   policy   against  
termination  of  employment”). 
 26 American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs, Featured Report: Medical 
Marijuana (A-01) (2001), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/13625.html (last visited Feb. 21, 
2008) [hereinafter AMA Report] (citing Pierri J. Chait, Effects of Smoked Marijuana on Human 
Performance:  A Critical Review, in Marijuana/Cannabinoids: Neurobiology and Neurophysiology 
387–424 (A. Bartke & L. Murphy, eds., CRC Press 1992)). 
 27 Id.; W. Hall & N. Solowij, Adverse Effects of Cannabis, 352 LANCET 1611–16 (1998). 
 28 AMA Report, supra note 26. 
 29 Id. 
 30 United   States  Dep’t   of  Health  &  Human   Servs.,   Nat’l   Insts.   of  Health,   Nat’l   Inst.   on  Drug  
Abuse, InfoFacts: Marijuana 3 (Apr. 2006), available at http://www.drugabuse.gov/PDF/InfoFacts/ 
Marijuana06.pdf (citing Michael R. Polen, et al., Health Care Use by Frequent Marijuana Smokers 
Who Do Not Smoke Tobacco, 158 WEST J. MED 596–601 (1993)). 
 31 Id. 
LA FETRA 1/16/2009 1:57 PM 
76 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 12:71 
compromises the ability to learn and remember information, so that a user’s 
job performance and intellectual or social skills are more likely to 
diminish.32  Other studies associate marijuana smoking with increased 
absences, tardiness, accidents, workers’ compensation claims, and job 
turnover.  For example, “[a] study among postal workers found that 
employees who tested positive for marijuana on a pre-employment urine 
drug test had 55 percent more industrial accidents, 85 percent more 
injuries, and a 75 percent increase in absenteeism compared with those who 
tested negative for marijuana use.”33  A recent study by the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services found that, of workers who 
admitted ingesting marijuana within the past month, 13.1% worked for 
three or more employers in the past year; 16.1% missed two or more days 
of work in the past month due to illness or injury; and 16.9% skipped one 
or more days of work in the past month.34  For those workers who did not 
use marijuana in the past month, only 5.2% worked for three or more 
employers in the past year; 11.2% missed two or more days of work in the 
past month due to illness or injury; and 8.3% skipped one or more days of 
work in the past month.35  The most dramatic findings, therefore, relate to a 
marijuana user’s ability to maintain consistency in his employment, both in 
staying with one employer for more than a few months and actually 
showing up for work. 
C. Off-Duty Marijuana Use also Affects Employee Performance and is of 
Legitimate Concern to Employers 
Some argue that there is a distinction between on-duty and off-duty 
marijuana use.  In Ross, the employee argued that California Health & 
Safety Code section 11362.785(a), which states, “[n]othing in this article 
shall require any accommodation of any medical use of marijuana on the 
property or premises of any place of employment or during the hours of 
 
 32 Id. at 4. 
 33 Id. at 5 (citing Craig Zwerling, et al., The Efficacy of Preemployment Drug Screening for 
Marijuana and Cocaine in Predicting Employment Outcome, 264 JAMA 2639–43 (1990); A.J. Gruber, 
et al., Attributes of Long-Term Heavy Cannabis Users:  A Case-Control Study, 33 PSYCHOL. MED. 
1415, 1415–22 (2003) (finding that heavy marijuana abusers reported that the drug impaired several 
important measures of life achievement including cognitive abilities, career status, social life, and 
physical and mental health)); see also Teahan v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 80 F.3d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 
1996) (noting the link between alcohol and drug use and excessive absenteeism); Willner v. 
Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1192–93 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing these and other studies and concluding, 
“[t]hese   studies   and   others   mentioned   in   the   Postal   Service   report   thus   confirm   what   one   would  
expect—an extremely high correlation between a positive result in a pre-employment drug test and 
subsequent  employment  problems.”). 
 34 SHARON L. LARSON, ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WORKER SUBSTANCE USE 
AND WORKPLACE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 62 (2007), available at http://oas.samhsa.gov/work2k7/ 
work.pdf (surveying full-time workers from 2002–04).  These numbers are very close to the 
percentages reported by workers who used other illicit drugs, such as heroin, cocaine, and 
methamphetamines, where the survey found 12.3% worked for three or more employers in the past 
year; 16.4% missed two or more days of work in the past month due to illness or injury; and 16.3% 
skipped one or more days of work in the past month.  Id. 
 35 Id. 
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employment,” means that while employers are not required to 
accommodate the actual ingestion or storage of marijuana on company 
premises, employers are required to accommodate employees under the 
influence of marijuana ingested elsewhere.36  The dissent agreed with this 
argument.37  In syllogistic form, the argument goes like this: 
1.  Employers are not required to accommodate the presence or 
ingestion of marijuana on company premises. 
2.  Ross possesses and ingests marijuana at home, not on company 
premises. 
3.  Therefore, employers are required to accommodate Ross’s 
marijuana use. 
This combines the logical fallacy of negative premises with the fallacy 
of illicit process of a major term.  In formal terms of Aristotelian logic, the 
premise is the universal negative proposition that “employers are not 
required to accommodate drug use on the premises” from which the dissent 
infers the contrapositive of that proposition, that “employers are required to 
accommodate drug use off the premises.”  “By the laws of logic, however, 
the inference of the contrapositive is invalid where the starting proposition 
is a universal negative.”38  Compounding this logical error is the invalidity 
of the major term.  In Logic for Lawyers, former Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert cited the following example of the 
fallacy, which bears a striking resemblance to Ross’s argument: 
1. Larceny is a crime. 
2. Driving under the influence is not larceny. 
3. Therefore, driving under the influence is not a crime.39 
The major term of the premise is “crime,” while the major term that 
follows is “driving.”  To come to a logical conclusion, the major term must 
exist in the premise.  Similarly, the dissent’s major term of “ingesting 
marijuana at home” does not exist in the premise, in which the major term 
is “ingesting marijuana at work.” 
Moreover, the biomedical facts of marijuana use do not allow for such 
separation between on-duty and off-duty use.  While many effects of 
marijuana dissipate over a short period of time, others—such as respiratory 
ailments and decreased cognitive ability resulting from prolonged exposure 
 
 36 Ross v. RagingWire Telecomm., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 207–08 (Cal. 2008) (quoting CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.785(a) (West 2008)). 
 37 Id. at 209–10 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 38 Bailey v. Maryland, 294 A.2d 123, 129 n.4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972); see also RUGGERO J. 
ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS:  A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING 156–58 (3d ed., National 
Institute for Trial Advocacy 1997). 
 39  Ernest F. Lidge III, The Meaning of Discrimination: Why Courts Have Erred in Requiring 
Employment  Discrimination  Plaintiffs  to  Prove  That  the  Employer’s  Action  Was  Materially  Adverse  or  
Ultimate, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 333, 364 (1999) (citing RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A 
GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING 153–54 (1990)). 
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to marijuana—remain concerns over the long term.  For example, memory 
defects may last as long as six weeks after an individual’s last use.40  These 
effects, particularly on cognitive abilities that may cause lapses in 
judgment, are a valid concern for employers.41 
D. A Policy Favoring Drug-Free Workplaces has no Discernable Impact 
on the Availability of Willing and Able Workers 
In his opening brief to the California Supreme Court, Ross argued that 
an adverse ruling “will deprive the State of California the benefit of 
thousands of productive workers.”42  Yet under the court’s ruling, 
employers still may choose to permit individuals who use medical 
marijuana to continue their employment—at least if they are not bound by 
the various federal or state Drug-Free Workplace Acts.  Even after Ross, 
employers are permitted, but not required to continue employing medical 
marijuana-using employees.43  Moreover, there is no evidence of the 
number of “productive workers” who are at risk of being fired if employers 
retain a choice of whether to accommodate medical marijuana use.44 
The experience of other states belies this fearmongering.  The medical 
marijuana statutes of other states contain explicit provisions that employers 
need not accommodate the use of medical marijuana by their employees.45  
 
 40 Abbie Crites-Leoni, Medicinal Use of Marijuana: Is the Debate a Smoke Screen for Movement 
Toward Legalization?, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 273, 280 (1998) (citing Schwartz, et al., Short-Term Memory 
Impairment in Cannabis-Dependent Adolescents, 143 AM. J. DIS. CHILD. 1214 (1989)). 
 41 See Burger v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 801 A.2d 487, 490–91 (Pa. 2002) (noting 
that  where  a  nurse’s  aide  was  fired  after  acknowledging  her  use  of  marijuana  every  night,  “[t]here  is  no  
question Claimant could be fired for her drug use; a responsible nursing home cannot be criticized for 
this,”  but  found  her  actions  did  not  constitute  “willful  misconduct”  to  justify  denial  of  unemployment 
benefits); In re Cahill, 585 A.2d 977, 979 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (finding that where a 
firefighter’s  current  alcoholism  and  illegal  drug  use  would  probably  cause  injury  to  himself  or  to  others,  
an   “employer   is   not   required   to   assume . . . that the employee will limit alcohol and other drug 
consumption to off-duty  hours,  or  that  the  effects  of  drugs  will  be  dissipated  by  the  time  work  begins,”  
especially  because  firefighters  are  “subject  to  being  called  to  duty  when  needed”). 
 42 Appellant’s  Opening Brief at 37, Ross v. RagingWire Telecomm., Inc., 174 P.3d 200 (Cal. 
2008) (No. S138130). 
 43 Similarly, the language in Health & Safety Code section 11362.785(d)—“[n]othing   in   this  
article shall require a governmental, private, or any other health insurance provider or health care 
service  plan  to  be  liable  for  any  claim  for  reimbursement  for  the  medical  use  of  marijuana”—does not 
mean that a health insurance provider is prohibited from reimbursing the cost of medical marijuana.  
That choice is left in the hands of the insurers.  Incidentally, this provision also marks a significant 
distinction between medical marijuana and prescription drugs lawfully obtained.  CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 11362.785(d) (West 2007). 
 44 See Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 289 (Cal. 1982) (en banc) (upholding Proposition 8 
and   finding   that   “petitioners’   forecast   of   judicial   and   educational   chaos   is   exaggerated   and   wholly  
conjectural”);;   In re Estate of Maniscalco, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 803, 806 (Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting 
“unsupported  speculation”  of  “dire  consequences”  “without  statistical  or  evidentiary  basis”). 
 45 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §   17.37.040(d)   (2006)   (“Nothing   in   this   chapter   requires   any  
accommodation  of  any  medical  use  of  marijuana  (1)  in  any  place  of  employment”);; COLO. CONST. art. 
XVIII,  §  14(10)(b)   (“Nothing   in   this   section  shall   require  any  employer   to  accommodate   the  medical  
use  of  marijuana  in  any  work  place.”);;  MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-205(2)(b)  (2007)  (“Nothing  in  this  
chapter may be construed to require: (b) an employer to accommodate the medical use of marijuana in 
any workplace.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.   §   453A.800   (LexisNexis   2005)   (“The   provisions   of   this  
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Lacking the modifiers of “on the premises” or “during the hours of 
employment,” these statutes plainly permit employers to refrain from hiring 
medical marijuana users who test positive on pre-employment drug tests, 
apparently without causing dire consequences. 
E. Employers may be Liable for Actions of Impaired Employees 
History abounds with cases of employers found liable because their 
employees were driving vehicles, operating heavy equipment, or otherwise 
performing tasks made more dangerous by their being under the influence 
of alcohol or drugs.46  More recently, however, California courts are even 
willing to consider bizarre and unforeseeable acts, or brutal, violent, and 
sexual crimes, as falling within the “scope of employment” to reach the 
employer’s deeper pocket.47  Facing the expanding specter of liability, 
employers must be able to cull out job applicants whose alcohol or drug use 
raises the likelihood of threats to the safety of the workplace, other 
employees or third parties.48  “Forcing the employers to retain current drug 
 
chapter do not:  2. Require any employer to accommodate the medical use of marijuana in the 
workplace.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 475.340   (2005)   (“Nothing   in   ORS   475.300   to   475.346   shall   be  
construed to require: (2) An employer to accommodate the medical use of marijuana in any 
workplace.”);;  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.060(4)  (West  2007)  (“Nothing  in  this  chapter requires 
any  accommodation  of  any  medical  use  of  marijuana  in  any  place  of  employment”). 
 46 See, e.g., Howell v. Ferry Transp., Inc., 929 So. 2d 226, 227–231 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (holding 
employer liable for negligent hiring and supervision when employee truck driver caused an accident 
killing seven people and subsequently tested positive for marijuana); Or v. Edwards, 818 N.E.2d 163, 
169 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (holding landlord liable for negligent hiring when a stoned and drunk 
custodian kidnapped, raped, and murdered a five-year-old girl, which the court found to be a 
foreseeable  consequence  of  the  landlord’s  failure  to  inquire about  the  custodian’s  history  of  alcohol  and  
drug abuse). 
 47 See, e.g., Doe v. Capital Cities, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 122, 129–30 (Ct. App. 1996) (aspiring actor 
could pursue a FEHA sexual harassment claim against ABC/Capital Cities for rape and beating by a 
casting director); Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510, 514 (Ct. App. 1998) (law firm 
liable under FEHA for compensatory and   punitive   damages   for   partner’s   sexual   harassment   of   his  
secretary); cf. Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1352 (Cal. 1991) (finding it unjust for 
an employer to disclaim responsibility for injuries occurring in the course of its characteristic activities 
where a police officer raped a woman he had arrested and placed in his squad car); Lisa M. v. Henry 
Mayo   Newhall   Mem’l   Hosp.,   907   P.2d   358,   362   (Cal.   1995)   (finding   that   an   employer   may   be  
vicariously   liable   for   the   employee’s   tort—even if it was malicious, willful, or criminal—if the 
employee’s  act  was  an  “outgrowth”  of  his  employment,  “inherent  in  the  working  environment,”  “typical  
of   or   broadly   incidental   to”   the   employer’s   business,   or,   “in   a   general   way,   foreseeable   from   [his]  
duties.”); see also Laura L. Hirschfeld, Legal Drugs? Not Without Legal Reform: The Impact of Drug 
Legalization on Employers Under Current Theories of Enterprise Liability, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 757, 795–99, 805–07 (1998) (citing seminal examples of extreme employee behavior in Bushey 
v.  United  States,  398  F.2d  167,  168  (2d  Cir.  1968)  (a  Coast  Guard  employee  on  leave,  “in  the  condition  
for  which  seamen  are  famed,”  turned  the  valves  that  controlled  the  water  flow  into  the  drydock  where  
the [ship] was docked, resulting in a flood that caused the ship to list, slide off its blocks and fall against 
the wall, partially sinking both the ship and the drydock); Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 124 Cal. 
Rptr. 143, 143, 146-47 (Ct. App. 1975) (holding the subcontractor vicariously liable for the beer-fueled, 
brutal   beating   received   by   two   of   the   general   contractor’s   employees   at   the   hands   of   two   of   the  
subcontractor’s  employees.)). 
 48 See Christine   Neylon   O’Brien,   Facially Neutral No-Rehire Rules and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 114,  115   (2004)   (“When  substance  abuse   impairs  an  
employee at work, it negatively impacts the quality of products produced and services performed, and 
consequently,  detracts  from  the  profitability  of  the  business.”). 
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users would close off one of the few methods that modern employers have 
left to insulate themselves from unlimited liability”49 for every wrongful act 
committed by employees.  Employers should not be saddled with a work 
force engaged in drug use that is largely prohibited by law. 
II.  THE BREADTH OF THE COMPASSIONATE USE ACT AND FEHA 
COMBINE TO COVER AN EXTREMELY WIDE RANGE OF ACTIVITY 
With the Ross decision, California employers can breathe a sigh of 
relief because a contrary result would have had far-ranging implications.  
There is a huge swath of individuals covered under both the Compassionate 
Use Act and FEHA, governing situations far removed from this case. 
A. The Compassionate Use Act Permits the Use of Marijuana for 
Virtually Any Malady, as Authorized by “Healers” of All Varieties 
Californians voted for Proposition 215, the Compassionate Use Act, 
based on ballot materials that emphasized the need for seriously ill people 
to obtain marijuana to relieve symptoms related to AIDS, chemotherapy 
treatments, and other very serious ailments.  The Compassionate Use Act 
authorized the use of marijuana for these purposes, but it also did a lot 
more.  Ballot literature emphasized that the proposition would allow 
“seriously and terminally ill patients to legally use marijuana, if, and only 
if, they have the approval of a licensed physician.”50  But this argument 
suggested limitations not found in the text of the law.  For example, Health 
& Safety Code section 11362.5 may be read to allow the use of marijuana 
by patients that are not seriously and terminally ill,51 and the law contains 
no requirement that the recommendation come from a licensed physician.  
For example, in People v. Spark,52 the court opined: 
[T]he voters of California did not intend to limit the compassionate use defense 
to those patients deemed by a jury to be “seriously ill.”  As is evidenced by the 
entirety of the language of subdivision (b)(1)(A) and the language of subdivision 
(d) of section 11362.5, the question of whether the medical use of marijuana is 
appropriate for a patient’s illness is a determination to be made by a physician.  
A physician’s determination on this medical issue is not to be second-guessed by 
 
 49 Hirschfeld, supra note 47, at 840. 
 50 CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION, NOVEMBER 5, 1996, ARGUMENT IN 
FAVOR OF PROPOSITION 215 at 60, available at http://library.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1996g.pdf 
[hereinafter Ballot Pamphlet]. 
 51 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West 2007) provides: 
To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for 
medical purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate and has been 
recommended  by   a  physician  who  has  determined   that   the  person’s  health  would  benefit  
from the use of marijuana in the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, 
spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for which marijuana provides 
relief. 
(emphasis added). 
 52 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 840, 846–47 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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jurors who might not deem the patient’s condition to be sufficiently “serious.”53 
The campaign literature also suggested that marijuana use is 
appropriate for a limited number of specific diseases: cancer, glaucoma, 
AIDS, multiple sclerosis, epilepsy, and spinal cord injuries.54  The primary 
sponsor of Proposition 215, Dennis Peron’s Californians for 
Compassionate Use, published a brochure stating that marijuana has been 
shown to “help migraine headaches, relieve menstrual cramps, help 
overcome insomnia, and mitigate withdrawal from alcohol and other hard 
drugs.”55  So while the ballot materials and Ross focused on the least 
controversial uses of medical marijuana, the broad language in the actual 
statute supports a much wider range of illnesses for which marijuana may 
be approved.  For example, in People v. Jones,56 evidence of physician 
“approval” for marijuana use to combat migraine headaches—the 
physician’s comment, “It might help; go ahead”—was sufficient to raise a 
defense under the Compassionate Use Act even where the physician 
disclaimed any intention to “recommend” marijuana use.57 
Moreover, Proposition 215 does not define the term “physician.”58  
This ambiguity could lead to a broad definition if courts employ the 
dictionary definition of the term.59  A “physician” may be a person “skilled 
in the art of healing” regardless of whether that person is a licensed medical 
doctor.60  “A wide variety of professionals are skilled in the art of healing, 
 
 53 However, there must be some physical aspect to the ailment.  See People v. Trippet, 66 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 559, 568–69 (Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the Compassionate Use Act does not protect against 
prosecution  of  marijuana  use  for  “spiritual  purposes.”). 
 54 Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 50, at 62. 
 55 Michael Vitiello, Proposition 215:  De Facto Legalization of Pot and the Shortcomings of 
Direct Democracy, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 707, 716 (1998), citing Californians for Compassionate 
Use, Brochure (1996) (internal quotations omitted). 
 56 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 916, 918 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 57 See Allison L. Bergstrom, Medical Use of Marijuana: A Look at Federal & State Responses to 
California’s  Compassionate  Use  Act, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.  155,  177   (1997)   (“The  question  
remains  open  as  to  whether  a  physician’s  tacit  approval,  perhaps  through  a  simple  nod  in  response  to a 
patient’s  stated  intention  to  use  marijuana,  would  meet  the  threshold  requirement  for  approval.”). 
 58 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2008).  In 2004, the Legislature enacted 
Section  11362.7(a),  which  provided  a  definition  for  “Attending  physician”: 
[A]n individual who possesses a license in good standing to practice medicine or 
osteopathy issued by the Medical Board of California or the Osteopathic Medical Board of 
California and who has taken responsibility for an aspect of the medical care, treatment, 
diagnosis, counseling, or referral of a patient and who has conducted a medical 
examination  of  that  patient  before  recording  in  the  patient’s  medical  record  the  physician’s  
assessment of whether the patient has a serious medical condition and whether the medical 
use of marijuana is appropriate. 
Statutes enacted by initiative cannot be amended by the Legislature, however, so this definition must be 
confined to the registration identification program of that particular code section.  See Rossi v. Brown, 
889  P.2d  557,  561  n.2  (Cal.  1995)  (“Once  adopted,  unless  the  measure  otherwise  provides,  an  initiative  
statute  may  be  amended  or  repealed  only  by  a  statute  approved  by  the  voters.”). 
 59 See, e.g., Martin v. Superior Court, 281 Cal. Rptr. 682, 685 (Ct. App. 1991) (using a dictionary 
to  define  “law  enforcement  officer”  broadly  in  Proposition  115). 
 60 WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 887 (9th ed. 1989); AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1367  (3d  ed.  1996)  (“A  person  who  heals or exerts a healing 
influence.”). 
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including chiropractors, homeopaths, and a variety of therapists.”61  
Alternatively, courts could define “physician” more narrowly, based on 
other statutes in the Health & Safety Code and the ballot arguments.62  But 
the courts have not yet ruled on this question and the ambiguity remains.  If 
physicians other than medical doctors are authorized to recommend 
marijuana, this may increase the range of conditions for which patients 
obtain approval to use marijuana to treat their symptoms.  While licensed 
medical practitioners have an affirmative defense under state law,63 they 
may be unwilling to prescribe marijuana either because they feel the 
benefits do not outweigh the risks, or they may fear prosecution under 
federal drug laws.64  Alternative healers, on the other hand, may exercise 
less restraint.65  Had the California Supreme Court held that Ragingwire 
must accommodate Ross’s marijuana use, the decision would have had 
consequences far beyond the facts of this case.  If an employer must 
accommodate an employee’s medical marijuana use based on a physician’s 
note to treat back spasms and pain, then the employer equally must 
accommodate an employee’s medical marijuana use based on a healer’s 
half-hearted approval (but not recommendation) that the employee “go 
ahead and try” marijuana for an entire range of ailments that a jury might 
describe as “not serious.” 
B. FEHA’s Anti-Discrimination Provisions Cover a Wide Range of 
Physical and Medical Ailments 
The California Fair Employment and Housing Act establishes the 
following civil rights: 
 
 61 Michael Vitiello, Proposition 215:  De Facto Legalization, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 707, 
719; see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 1000–1058 (West 2008) (regulation of chiropractors); id. §§ 
2620–2696 (physical therapy). 
 62 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11024 (West 2008); Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 50, at 
50 (specifying  “licensed  physician”). 
 63 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(c) (West 2008). 
 64 See Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 700 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (concluding that federal 
officials   “may   only   prosecute   physicians  who   recommend  medical  marijuana   to   their   patients   if   the  
physicians are liable for aiding and abetting   or   conspiracy.”).      Subsequently,   “the   court   entered   a  
permanent  injunction  limiting  the  government’s  ability  to  revoke  a  physician’s  DEA  registration  if  he  or  
she recommends medical marijuana based upon a sincere medical judgment . . .”  but  did  not  rule on the 
claim regarding the exclusion of doctors from the Medicare and Medicaid programs.”  Pearson v. 
McCaffrey, 139 F. Supp. 2d 113, 116 n.2 (D.D.C. 2001).  However, the Department of Justice 
disagreed: 
[A] practitioner’s  action  of  recommending  or  prescribing Schedule I controlled substances 
is  not  consistent  with  the  “public  interest”  (as  that  phrase  is  used  in  the  federal  Controlled  
Substances Act) and will lead to administrative action by the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) to revoke the practitioner’s   registration.      DOJ   and . . . HHS will 
send a letter to national, state, and local practitioner associations and licensing boards 
which states unequivocally that DEA will seek to revoke the DEA registrations of 
physicians who recommend or prescribe Schedule I controlled substances. 
Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy, The   Administration’s  
Response to the Passage of California Proposition 215 and Arizona Proposition 200, 62 Fed. Reg. 
6164 (Feb. 11, 1997). 
 65 See Vitiello, supra note 61, at 720–21. 
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(a) The opportunity to seek, obtain and hold employment without discrimination 
because of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical 
disability, mental disability, medical condition, marital status, sex, age, or sexual 
orientation is hereby recognized as and declared to be a civil right. 
(b) The opportunity to seek, obtain, and hold housing without discrimination 
because of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national 
origin, ancestry, familial status, disability, or any other basis prohibited by 
Section 51 of the Civil Code is hereby recognized as and declared to be a civil 
right.66 
Civil Code section 51 also prohibits discrimination based on “medical 
condition,”67 which is incorporated into the housing discrimination 
prohibition of Government Code section 12921(b).  It is also unlawful, in 
the employment context, “[f]or an employer, because of the . . . physical 
disability, mental disability, medical condition . . . to refuse to hire or 
employ the person . . . .”68 
The California Legislature intended FEHA to have a very broad scope, 
even compared to the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.  
Section 12926.1 of the California Government Code highlights the 
difference by declaring: 
The law of this state in the area of disabilities provides protections independent 
from those in the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 
101-336).  Although the federal act provides a floor of protection, this state’s law 
has always, even prior to passage of the federal act, afforded additional 
protections.69 
Under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), a person 
can claim the protections of the Act when the disability “substantially 
limits” a major life activity.  An impairment is “substantially limiting” if 
the person is either “unable to perform a major life activity that the average 
person in the general population can perform,” or is significantly restricted 
in the condition, manner or duration under which a major life activity can 
be performed compared to an average person in the general population.70  
By contrast, FEHA requires only that the impairment “limit,” rather than 
substantially limit, a major life activity.71  An impairment limits a major 
life activity if it “makes the achievement of a major life activity more 
difficult.”72  FEHA’s less stringent standard is intended to provide 
 
 66 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12921 (West 2008) (emphasis added). 
 67 CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (West 2008). 
 68 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (West 2008).  But see 2 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 7293.6(d) (“The  
unlawful use of controlled substances or other drugs shall not be deemed, in and of itself, to constitute a 
physical  disability  or  a  mental  disability.”). 
 69 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926.1(a) (West 2008). 
 70 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j); see also Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195–
196 (2002) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)); Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)). 
 71 CAL. GOV’T CODE §12926(k)(1)(B)(i) (West 2008); see also Colmenares v. Braemar Country 
Club, 63 P.3d 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 72 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926(k)(1)(B)(ii) (West 2008). 
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protection for a significant number of conditions that would not be 
protected under the ADA, including episodic conditions which lack the 
permanency to be considered “substantial” under federal law.73 
Moreover, while the ADA does not cover disabilities that can be 
remedied by “mitigating factors” such as medication or eyeglasses,74 FEHA 
evaluates the impairment without regard to mitigating factors that could be, 
or actually are, taken.75  The ADA also requires that an employee’s 
“substantial impairment” is such that an employee cannot perform a broad 
range or class of jobs as compared to the average person having 
comparable skills, abilities, and training.76  Thus, the ADA will not cover 
an employee’s inability to perform a particular job.77  In contrast, FEHA 
does cover situations where an impairment prevents an employee from 
performing one particular job.78  The California Supreme Court has noted 
FEHA’s expansive reach.79 
The California Legislature recently imported these broad FEHA 
standards and definitions to each of the thirty-three employment anti-
discrimination statutes scattered throughout the California Code.80  
“FEHA’s list of prohibited discrimination standards is more extensive than 
any of the statutes Chapter 788 amends.”81  Moreover, Chapter 788 extends 
the authority of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board to decertify any 
labor organization that the Department of Fair Employment and Housing 
finds to have discriminated based on any standard listed in the FEHA. 
 
 73 Id. § 12926.1(c). 
 74 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 
527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999). 
 75 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926.1(c) (West 2008). 
 76 Sutton, supra note 74, at 491–92. 
 77 Id. (emphasis added). 
 78 As stated in California Government Code section 12926.1(c): 
Under the law of this state, whether a condition limits a major life activity shall be 
determined without respect to any mitigating measures, unless the mitigating measure itself 
limits a major life activity, regardless of federal law under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990.  Further, under the   law   of   this   state,   “working”   is   a   major   life   activity,  
regardless of whether the actual or perceived working limitation implicates a particular 
employment or a class or broad range of employments. 
See also Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 102 Cal. Rptr 55, 64 (Ct. App. 2000) (quoting § 12926.1(c)); 
Cripe v. City of San Jose, 261 F.3d 877, 895 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting § 12926.1(c)). 
 79 See Rojo  v.  Kliger,  801  P.2d  373,  383  (Cal.  1990)  (“While   the  FEHA  conferred  certain  new  
rights and created new remedies, its purpose was not to narrow, but to expand the rights and remedies 
available  to  victims  of  discrimination.”);;  Colmenares  v.  Braemar  Country  Club,  Inc.,  63  P.3d  220,  227  
(Cal. 2003) (FEHA defines physical disability more broadly than the federal Americans with 
Disabilities Act.). 
 80 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4592–610 (West).  The affected statutes are: CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 
44100, 44858, 45293, 69958, 87100, 88112 (West Supp. 2008); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 19572, 19572.1, 
19702, 19704, 19793; CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1735, 1777.6, 3095 (West Supp. 2008); CAL. MIL. & VET. 
CODE § 130 (West Supp. 2008); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 25051, 28850, 30750, 50120, 70121, 90300, 
95650, 98161, 100303, 101343, 102402, 103403, 120504, 125523 (West Supp. 2008); CAL. UNEMP. 
INS. CODE § 1256.2 (West Supp. 2008); and CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11320.31, 11322.62, 
14087.28 (West Supp. 2008). 
 81 2004 Cal. Stat. 788; Jason L. Eliaser, Consistency  in  California’s  Employment  Discrimination  
Laws:  Chapter  788’s  Dissemination  of  FEHA  Standards, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 871, 873 (2005). 
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Had the California Supreme Court held that the Compassionate Use 
Act required accommodation under FEHA, the combination of the broad 
language in the Compassionate Use Act and the comprehensive reach of 
FEHA would have placed employers in an untenable position that drafters 
of these statutes could not have independently have envisioned. 
CONCLUSION 
Applying the plain language of the Compassionate Use Act, the 
California Supreme Court properly respected the intent of the voters to 
permit a large number of patients to use marijuana free from the threat of 
criminal prosecution, while recognizing that the Act does not stand as a 
statutory trump card over every other statute and common law duty.  
Employers who contract with, or receive grants from, the federal and state 
governments are required to comply with drug-free workplace laws or risk 
serious penalties, including debarment.  All employers are legitimately 
concerned with the hazards presented by employees who are physically or 
mentally impaired due to marijuana use, particularly when such impaired 
employees may cause harm to their co-workers or customers, rendering 
their employers liable under common law tort theories.  Rather than 
stretching the language of the Compassionate Use Act to cover 
employment situations never mentioned in the statute or contemplated by 
the voters, and creating an untenable situation for all California employers, 
the California Supreme Court’s ruling correctly recognizes the limitations 
of the Act as written. 
